We identify 51 instances since 1957 when an economy abandoned a fixed exchange rate for greater flexibility and saw its currency appreciate or remain broadly unchanged. These economies experienced a wide variety of macroeconomic responses. Those with high investment rates and rapidly growing trade experienced declines in growth, while more open economies and countries with more international reserves tended to experience falls in inflation. These patterns have obvious implications for the current economic circumstances and prospects of China.
Introduction
The maintenance of currency pegs by fast-growing emerging markets has become a flash point in discussions of economic policy. Not a few observers concerned for the stability of the international economic and financial system argue that international balance could be better maintained and global financial stability enhanced if emerging markets like China abandoned their pegs in favor of regimes of greater flexibility. In addition, more flexible exchange rates would give emerging markets greater ability to tailor policy to domestic conditions. Where growth is strong and inflation is a problem, currency appreciation would help damp down inflationary pressures and avoid asset bubbles and overheating. It would facilitate efforts in these countries to rebalance away from exports in favor of domestic spending. It would give them an additional instrument -a more flexible exchange rate -with which to cope with volatile capital flows as the capital account of the balance of payments becomes more open. 1 Greater flexibility on the part of countries like China, implying less foreign exchange market intervention, would also slow the accumulation of reserves in the form of U.S. treasury and other advanced-country securities. It would help the United States grow its exports. Insofar as exchange rates fixed at inappropriate levels contributed to global imbalances and thereby helped to plant the seeds for the global financial crisis, this is an issue of not just national but international significance. Thus, not only the IMF but high officials in both the United States and Europe regularly make the case for greater exchange-rate flexibility to emerging markets like China. appreciations, but a number of their observations are step revaluations rather than appreciations that occurred in conjunction with a change in the exchange rate regime.
Our approach is different. We examine a comprehensive data set covering over 200 countries and territories, both developing and advanced, since 1957. 3 We focus on 51 instances where countries abandoned currency pegs for regimes of greater flexibility with a reasonable expectation that their currencies would appreciate. 4 Thus, we consider changes in exchange rate regime in the direction of greater flexibility but rule out cases where the change was followed by sharp currency depreciation. In other words, we are not interested in "crisis"
and "speculative attack" cases where a currency peg collapses under pressure, resulting in devaluation or sharp depreciation (having considered these cases elsewhere: see Eichengreen,
Rose and Wyplosz 1995). 5, 6 Rather, we focus on instances where a country shifts from a fixed to flexible exchange rate regime and either sees its exchange rate remain relatively unchanged or experiences an appreciation. 7 In spirit, our paper is closest to the Eichengreen and Masson et al. (1998) study (cited above) of exits from pegged exchange rates to greater flexibility. But our sample is larger and, we would argue, our methods are more systematic.
We examine the impact of these events, which we call "flexes," on a range of macroeconomic and financial variables, including GDP growth, export growth, consumption, investment and inflation. We compare the behavior of these variables in the "flexers" and a control group of countries maintaining a pegged exchange rate throughout. We look for and, where necessary, correct for selectivity bias by searching for differences in country circumstances in the period before the flex occurred. 8 Although our set of "treatment cases" is not large, the fact that it is larger and more comprehensive than in earlier studies undertaking similar analyses allows us to utilize more systematic empirical methods.
There over the periods three years before and after the change in exchange rate regime. We find similar results when we consider shorter periods. There is less evidence of a significant impact on the variables of interest when we compare longer periods, but this is plausible, since one would not expect a change in a nominal variable or in the regime governing its behavior to have implications for real variables over long horizons. 9 Some of the cases we examine are likely to be dismissed as special. For example, a disproportionate number are clustered around the time of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System; they are therefore not truly independent flexes insofar as they can also be understood as reflecting the U.S. decision to float the dollar and allow it to depreciate. Others occur in developing countries whose historical experience has not attracted much attention. But experience following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System is directly relevant to the future prospects of countries like China, insofar as their decisions to flex could result in the end of the regime that has been widely referred to as Bretton Woods II (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003). 10 And while the experience of those few low-to-middle-income countries that have appreciated out of fixed exchange rate regimes with limited capital mobility in the past may have not received much prior attention, it is directly relevant to the prospects for middleincome countries contemplating moving to a more flexible exchange rate today, like China. In any case, the advantage of constructing as large a sample as possible is that the supposed special nature of a subset of those cases need not dominate the results.
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The results reveal a wide range of responses of macroeconomic and financial variables.
Another way of putting this is that the very wide dispersion of results makes it hard to identify significant differences in the behavior of the variables of interest before and after flexing, or between the flexers and other countries, in the wake of the event. This suggests that our 51
cases are heterogeneous. 6 In a subset of cases, however, the decision to flex is followed by a discernible slowdown in the rate of economic growth. Slowdowns are most likely, we show, when the investment ratio is high, consumption, investment, exports and imports are growing rapidly, and money growth is fast. Since we only have 51 observations, confidence intervals tend to be wide, but the finding that slowdowns following flexes tend to occur in high-investment and rapid-exportgrowth economies is robust across samples and specifications. The implication is that China,
where both conditions prevail, may have some basis for worrying about the growth effects of appreciating out of its fixed exchange rate regime.
In a subset of cases, in addition, the decision to flex was followed by a significant decline in the rate of inflation. Slower inflation is most likely, we show, in countries that are relatively open to trade (where the reduction in the rate of import price inflation presumably has the greatest impact) and in countries with high foreign reserves (which had presumably been sterilizing capital inflows with less than complete success prior to the change in exchange rate regime). These results also have obvious implications for China, which is currently characterized by inflation and the other macroeconomic characteristics in question.
Section 2 describes our data, definitions and 51 cases. Section 3 discusses the determinants of flexes and the possibility of selection bias. The main results are in Section 4, which presents event studies and some simple regression analysis. In concluding, section 5 draws out the implications for China and the global-rebalancing debate. An appendix presents some case studies of flexing that were and were not accompanied by significant growth slowdowns.
Data and Definitions
Exchange rate regimes come in many flavors. Many countries, while not attempting to maintain a peg, manage their exchange rates heavily (they may declare a commitment to flexibility but in practice prevent the currency from moving). Others may refrain from intervening but still see their currency display broad stability. Some countries have multiple exchange rates; they may regulate one according to official policy but have a different exchange rate (often on the black market) that moves differently and is used for unofficial transactions.
The first and, in some sense, most important step in our analysis involves identifying shifts from regimes of pegged exchange rates to regimes of greater flexibility. For this purpose we use the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004, hereafter "RR") de facto classification of exchange rate regimes as extended by Reinhart, Rogoff and Ilzetzki. This taxonomy distinguishes 15 exchange rate regimes by degree of flexibility for 218 "countries" (some of which are, in practice, territories) and is available monthly from 1946m1 through 2007m9. In constructing their index, RR utilize information on both official and black market exchange rates. We treat the first four of their categories -no separate legal tender, pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, pre-announced horizontal band narrower than or equal to +/-2%, and de facto peg -as fixed exchange rate regimes. 13 We look for cases where countries moved away from these regimes; there are 119 such departures in the sample.
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Of course, there exist a number of alternative classifications of exchange rate regimes. and has a number of missing and inconclusive observations. 16 We look for cases where countries moved away from these regimes and then experienced either exchange rate appreciation or at most minor depreciation. 17 Thus, we rule out cases of devaluation and substantial depreciation -where the change in exchange rate regime was forced by market pressures. These cases of currency crisis and step devaluation have been studied before, as noted above. we consider official exchange rates against both the U.S. dollar and the SDR. 18 We review the observations one by one and exclude cases where the RR data set indicates a regime shift but there was no subsequent change in the official SDR exchange rate.
(Virtually without exception, there was also no change in the official dollar exchange rate in these cases.) We also exclude a number of questionable observations.
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We are then left with 51 cases. These are tabulated in Table 1 20 Most of these cases have only small changes in the exchange rates we consider. 21 We use two variants of our default definition of flexes to check for sensitivity. Our first variant drops (twelve) observations without any appreciation in any exchange rate, while our second drops (four) observations with large (double-digit) appreciations. Both variants are marked in the table.
As previously noted, a substantial fraction of our cases (20 out of 51) are clustered around the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, when other currencies began floating against the dollar (although there were also flexes in the 1960s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s). 22 At some level this is not especially disturbing. The greater flexibility of, inter alia, the German deutschemark and the Japanese yen in the period after the Bretton Woods System dissolved is one of the main precedents to which observers point when imagining the consequences of a Chinese transition to greater flexibility (and the dissolution of the so-called Bretton Woods II system). 23 Thus it is not inappropriate that our sample should be weighted toward this episode.
Selectivity
Below we will ask how macroeconomic and financial variables behave in the wake of a decision to abandon a currency peg in favor of greater flexibility and allow the currency to appreciate or at least not depreciate significantly. A logically prior question, however, is whether the post-exit behavior of our variables is affected by their exceptional behavior in the immediately preceding period. Are our findings for the post-exit period contaminated by selectivity, in other words?
There is good reason to think that countries choosing to move to greater exchange rate flexibility do not do so randomly. An obvious source of selection is country size. Very small open economies tend not to have floating exchange rates. 24 Those with pegged exchange rates are correspondingly less likely to abandon them for greater flexibility. Conditioning on country size when undertaking the kind of analysis conducted here is doubly important, moreover, insofar as the macroeconomic impact of a change in China's exchange rate regime is an obvious subtext of our study and China is located at an extreme of the country-size distribution.
While country size is an obvious source of selectivity, other potential sources are less obvious. For example, it is not obvious that fast growing countries might deliberately decide to flex as opposed to remaining in a fixed exchange rate regime in the hope that the good times associated with that regime might continue to roll. As a Chinese policy maker well might ask, why mess with success?
We probe further for selectivity bias by examining whether countries that flex differ systematically from other countries in our sample. Since the decision to abandon a pegged exchange rate regime is an event with potentially important medium-term consequences and because the exact timing of the regime change is unimportant in understanding its determinants, we convert our annual data to 3-year averages. Since we already know that country size should vary with the exchange rate regime, we include it (along with country and time effects) as a conditioning variables. We are interested in whether there is evidence that other variables of interest affect the likelihood of flexing. If the rate of GDP growth, for example, has a significant effect in this probit model, that would be prima facie evidence of selection bias -that relatively slow or, more plausibly, fast growing countries (depending on the sign of the coefficients) are more likely to flex.
The answer is in Table 2 . The top panel displays a set of coefficients from bivariate probit regressions. Our baseline estimates on the left include both fixed time-and random country-specific effects. Almost without exception the variables of interest (GDP growth, export growth, investment growth, consumption growth, credit growth) do not enter the probit regressions significantly; the same is true of the real effective exchange rate and different measures of capital mobility. We interpret this as little evidence of the presence of selection bias in the relevant sense. While size as proxied by population is systematically associated with the probability of flexing in the bivariate regressions, this variable is very slowly moving and as such is not the focus of our analysis. 25 We also provide extensive sensitivity analysis in other columns of the table, dropping time effects, and also using two different variants of our measure of exchange rate flexing. However, our essential (non-) results seem robust to these perturbations of our basic setup. The results are also confirmed in the multivariate results tabulated in the lower panel of Table 2 .
We conclude that when analyzing their consequences, it seems reasonable to ignore the determinants of flexing (other than country size).
Main Results

Event Studies
We now use an event study approach to examine the behavior of our flexings in more detail. We use annual data, extracting most of our series from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The behavior of GDP growth around the time of our 51 flexings, for example, is shown in the top left panel of Figure 1 , starting five years beforehand, continuing through the event and extending to another five years afterwards. The average (mean) growth for the flexers is bracketed by +/-2 standard error deviation confidence bands to give some idea of the spread of the data.
Sixteen macroeconomic and financial variables are shown in Figure 1 . We choose these variables to cover a broad range of aspects of the macro-economy, placing special emphasis on those of particular relevance to China (e.g., export growth and the spending shares of consumption and investment).
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We compare our 51 flexers with a control group of country-year observations; the medians of our control group are also shown in Figure 1 (with horizontal lines). To construct our control group, we restrict our attention to the years in which flexes occurred. For those years, we then examine the behavior of countries that were not only fixed that year (using our Reinhart-Rogoff criterion) but had been fixed for the previous five years and remained fixed for another five years. Thus our control group consists of long-term fixers who chose not to switch their exchange rate regimes, observed at the time of the flexings.
The overwhelming impression is of little change between the periods before and after the event. The reassuring interpretation of this finding is that the negative effects of concern to those who resist the idea that emerging markets like China should abandon their pegs are not evident in similar prior episodes: for the sample as a whole, there is no sign of a significant deceleration in rates of GDP growth, investment growth, or export growth. The average behavior of flexers is also quite close to that of our control group of long-term fixers and is statistically indistinguishable from the latter.
A less reassuring interpretation from the analytical point of view is that there is considerable variation in behavior both before and after the event, making it impossible to identify overall responses. Flexing has occurred under a variety of different circumstances, the argument would go. Heterogeneity makes it impossible to identify subsequent changes in macroeconomic and financial outcomes. The width of the two standard deviation bands relative to the means is consistent with this view.
We can examine this behavior more systematically by regressing each of these variables, with the dependent variable centered on the date of the flex, on its own leads and lags. There is little evidence of unusual behavior in any of these variables in the years prior to the exit. The same is true of the coefficients on the leads: as in Figure 1 , where there is little evidence of changes in the behavior of our macroeconomic and financial variables before and after the 51 flexes, there is no evidence of significant changes in the behavior of the key variables after the fact.
This impression is further confirmed by Figure 2 , which uses a subset of the 51 flexes.
There we restrict the sample to the 32 exits from fixed regimes where the exchange rate appreciated or did not move over the subsequent three months (excluding the modest depreciations). Otherwise, Figure 2 is analogous to Figure 1 in its construction. It is also analogous in its results: there is no evidence for this more restrictive sample of significant changes in the behavior of the key variables.
It is striking to contrast these results with those for step devaluations (as in Cooper 1971 and his successors) and currency events and crises (as in Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1995 and the related literature). There one tends to find large and well-defined impacts on, inter alia, growth and inflation and evidence of nonrandom incidence (selectivity) before the fact.
The results here, in contrast, suggest that transitions from pegged exchange rates to regimes of greater flexibility are, if anything, a more heterogeneous lot.
A Closer Look
Event studies are intrinsically univariate and may therefore mask significant covariation among variables. A next step is therefore to examine bivariate correlations. Figure 3 links GDP growth rates to some key economic conditions around the time of our 51 flexes. In particular, the evolution in GDP growth rates -how they change from the three years prior to our flexes to the three-year period subsequent to the event -is juxtaposed against the behavior of consumption and investment (averaged over the three years before the flex). We look at these changes in growth rates and ask whether they are correlated with other potential variables of interest. Figure 3 indicates that countries experiencing rapid consumption and investment growth are more likely to experience slowdowns following the change in exchange rate regime.
Countries with low consumption shares of GDP and high investment shares are similarly likely to experience slowdowns. While there are some obvious outliers -the observations for Malta and Kuwait stand out, for example -they do not dictate the results. 27 Figure 4 is the analog to Figure 3 and portrays the growth effects for economies with rapid export and import growth; such economies are also more likely than those in which exports and imports are growing slowly to experience aggregate growth slowdowns following the change in exchange rate regime. All this points to China as a plausible example of an economy that might expect to see a significant slowdown in the wake of abandoning its peg and allowing its currency to appreciate. Table 3 Since lagged GDP growth enters as significantly, we include it as a control variable in the next column, and re-run our regressions as a form of sensitivity analysis. Further robustness checks retain lagged growth as a control but use the two different variants of our definition of flexing tabulated in Table 1 . The first variant (at least one exchange rate appreciated after flexing) has a maximum sample size of 39 observations, while the second (no double-digit appreciation) has a maximum sample size of 47 observations. The results obtained using these subsamples are reported in subsequent columns of Table 3 . The bottom line is that the essential results are the same.
While the aforementioned results are statistically significant, are the economic effects large? Consider the effect of the investment/GDP ratio, which takes on a coefficient of approximately -0.2. Its average level or our sample is around 22%, with a standard deviation of around 9%. A one standard deviation decline around the mean is therefore associated with a decline in the average annual rate of growth of .2*9% = 1.8%. While Chinese growth is high, its investment is also an extraordinarily high ratio of GDP; a decline of two standard deviations is not unthinkable (from its current level in excess of 40%). This would be a non-trivial economic effect on growth of around -3.5%; cataclysmic for an OECD country, though perhaps not for China.
The small number of available observations limits our ability to run multivariate regressions controlling for these country characteristics simultaneously. A few simple multivariate regressions, reported in Table 4a , however suggest that the most robust determinants of the change in GDP growth are a high investment rate and high import growth before the change in exchange rate regime. Table 4b is an analog that shows these results are insensitive to the inclusion of lagged real GDP growth as a control.
What of other consequences of flexes? Figure 6 is an analog to Figures 3 and 5 but focuses on (anti-)inflationary effects. Where Figures 3 and 5 for growth suggest that the change in this variable is a function mainly of domestic policies and conditions, Figure 6 suggests that the change in inflation depends more heavily on the external side of the economy. Inflation is more likely to fall when reserves had been high as a share of M2 or GDP, indicating a difficulty in completely sterilizing the effects of reserve accumulation. This result is strong and robust. It will resonate with those who think that China should contemplate greater currency flexibility and exchange rate appreciation in its fight against inflation.
Inflation is also more likely to fall in economies that are more open to trade, plausibly reflecting the moderating impact of flexing on import price inflation. One somewhat anomalous finding is that countries with current account deficits appear to be more likely to experience a decline in inflation than countries with surpluses; this result, however, is heavily driven by one observation.
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The regressions in Table 5 also confirm that the partial correlations for reserves are statistically significant at standard confidence levels. Countries with more reserves, which had presumably been intervening more heavily to prevent their exchange rate from moving (and appreciation) are more likely to experience a decline in inflation after flexing.
Finally, we examine whether the period after flexing is more likely to be punctuated by financial crises than the period before. We use three measures each for both banking and Table 6 shows tabulations of the number of crises and placid periods for both the (five) years before and after flexes, together with chi-square tests for equality across the periods. There is no evidence of a significant relationship for either banking or payments crises. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that flexes are not associated with a significant increase in crisis incidence. generalize our results to current circumstances. Our findings should be taken more cautiously still insofar as none of our analysis is structural.
We find strikingly little evidence of major macroeconomic effects -little support in other words for the view that flexing is likely to be a disaster. At the same time, it is possible to pinpoint the circumstances in which the decision to move to greater flexibility is likely to be followed by a significant economic slowdown. Slowdown-prone economies tend to be those with exceptionally low consumption and high investment rates. They are economies where exports and domestic credit have been growing rapidly. In other words, they are economies with Chinese characteristics.
These findings suggest that China may have good reason to be cautious about not moving away from its peg to the dollar. But they also point to the kind of policy reformsrebalancing away from exports, attaining a better balance between domestic consumption and investment, stabilizing the growth of credit -that the country should pursue in order to prepare the way for its eventual adoption of a more flexible exchange rate. The observations tabulated are for countries that have exited a fixed exchange rate regime (RR<5) to a more flexible exchange rate regime and have subsequently either a) appreciated or b) depreciated less than 5% over the next three months. Subsequent SDR, dollar, and parallel dollar depreciation rates tabulated on the right; further description available in the text. Exchange rates quoted as domestic price of foreign exchange, so that negative values indicate exchange rate appreciation. "Variant 1" observations without any appreciation marked by "a"; "Variant 2" observations without appreciations>10% marked by "b". 
Table 4a. Multivariate Impact of Various Factors on Change in GDP Growth Rate, Flexes
Coefficients from multivariate OLS regressions (one for each column), with absolute robust t-statistics recorded in parentheses; one/two/three asterisk(s) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .10/.05/.01 significance level. Default regressand: three year post-flex GDP growth rate -three year pre-flex GDP growth rate. Regressors are three-year averages of lagged variables in left column. Intercepts included but not recorded. Maximum of 51 observations (tabulated in Table 1 ). 
Annual Movements around (51) Exits
Means and +/-2se CI; Control Group Medians marked 
Spain 1973
Spain is an example of a country where flexing in 1974 was followed by a sharp deceleration in growth, which averaged fully 4.3 per cent less in the three years following the event than in the three before. then saw a further increase in reserves resulting from both higher capital imports and a sustained increase in the current surplus.
But the Swedish authorities considered the current account surplus to be temporary.
They worried that the strong external position was being achieved at the expense of a relatively high rate of unemployment and underutilization of resources at home. On December 21, 1971 , in response to the Smithsonian Agreement, they therefore pegged the krona at a rate of Thus, Sweden appears to be a case where not just the change in exchange rate regime but changes in other policies shaped the subsequent development of internal and external balance.
Malaysia 1973
Through the 1960s the Malaysian dollar (the ringitt from 1968) was pegged to the pound sterling. 35 The currency was also used by Singapore and Brunei under an interchangeability agreement. it quickly appreciated by some 5 per cent, with the central banking intervening only to ensure orderly market conditions. 36 In September 1975, in order to maintain stable exchange rates, it was then decided that exchange rate would be managed relative to a basket comprised of currencies of the countries that were Malaysia's principal trading partners.
The context for these decisions was a period of strong expansion, interrupted temporarily by a slowdown in 1971. Strong growth made currency appreciation a logical instrument with which to fight inflation. Shortly after the first OPEC oil shock, the ringgit was Rose (2011) . 25 In other words, its significance in these regressions is not relevant to the question at hand. This said, that this variable enters significantly is also reassuring in the sense that they indicate that our methodology is capable of finding significant effects of economic variables on exchange rate regime transitions, so long as they are truly relevant. 26 We have also examined a range of other variables with comparably weak results. 27 And in some cases they work against the conclusion in the text. 28 That for Nicaragua in 1993. 29 Recall that we are considering exits up rather than the more conventional regime collapses followed by currency crashes. 30 When the dollar appreciated in March-April and then depreciated in June-July, the Spanish authorities opted to follow the dollar. Thereafter they considered the depreciation of peseta excessive and widened the limits for central bank intervention, moving them closer to the lower edge of IMF fluctuation band. 31 This period coincided with the first oil shock, but the latter was not the entire story: Spanish GDP growth rates during the latter period were only slightly higher than OECD average growth rate whereas in the past they used to considerable higher than average OECD rates. 39 The government also adopted more restrictive fiscal and credit policies, including export taxes, credit growth ceilings and fiscal restraints.
